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Abstract
In the classical private information retrieval (PIR) setup, a user wants to retrieve a file from a database or
a distributed storage system (DSS) without revealing the file identity to the servers holding the data. In the
quantum PIR (QPIR) setting, a user privately retrieves a classical file by downloading quantum systems from
the servers. The QPIR problem has been treated by Song et al. in the case of replicated servers, both without
collusion and with all but one servers colluding. In this paper, the QPIR setting is extended to account for MDS
coded servers. The proposed protocol works for any [n, k]-MDS code and t-collusion with t = n− k. Similarly
to the previous cases, the rates achieved are better than those known or conjectured in the classical counterparts.
It is also demonstrated how the retrieval rates can be significantly improved by using locally repairable codes
(LRCs) consisting of disjoint repair groups, each of which is an MDS code. Finally, numerical results based
on an implementation on an IBM quantum computer are presented, showing that even the current stability of
quantum computers gives satisfactory results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Private information retrieval (PIR), a problem initially introduced by Chor et al. [1], enables a user to
download a data item from a database without revealing the identity of the retrieved item to the database
owner. During the past few years, PIR has gained renewed interest in the setting of distributed storage systems
(DSSs), where the servers are storing possibly large files that may be encoded, e.g., by an MDS code. The
capacity of PIR is already known in a variety of settings [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], but is still open for coded and
colluding servers [7], [8]. Progress towards the general coded colluded PIR capacity was recently made in [9],
[10].
More recently, Song et al. have considered a similar problem in a quantum setting. They consider a replicated
storage system with classical files, where the servers respond to user’s (classical) queries by sending quantum
systems. The user is then able to privately retrieve the file by measuring the quantum systems. The servers
are assumed to share some maximally entangled states, while the user and the servers are not entangled. The
non-colluding case was considered in [11], and was shown to have capacity equal to one. This is in contrast to
the classical replicated (asymptotic) PIR capacity 1− 1n for n servers. The case of all but one servers colluding
was considered in [12], again achieving higher capacity than the classical counterpart. In this case, the QPIR
capacity is 2n , while classically (and asymptotically) it is
1
n . In [13], the authors extend their work [11], [12]
by considering symmetric QPIR that can resist any t servers colluding. They prove that the t-private QPIR
capacity is 1 for 1 ≤ t ≤ n/2 and 2(n − t)/n for n/2 < t < n and they use the stabilizer formalism [14] to
construct a capacity-achieving protocol.
A. Contributions
We adapt the QPIR protocol for replicated storage systems protecting against collusion of all but one servers
[12] to the case of [n, k] MDS coded servers and arbitrary t-collusion. That is, from the case t = n − 1 to
t = n−k. This can be seen as trading off collusion protection for reduced storage overhead. The achieved rate
2
n is higher than the conjectured asymptotic rate in the classical coded and colluding PIR [7], giving
1
n .
The setup is very similar to [15], which provides an optimal classical PIR scheme for the case t = n − k.
This was extended to cover non-maximal collusion (t < n − k) in [7] by considering the queries as coming
from another code via the star product scheme. With this interpretation, the query code in [15] is the dual of
the storage code — similarly as in the QPIR protocol presented here — while [7] enables it to be any [n, t]
MDS code for t ≤ n−k. One may wonder why we do not do this generalization here, but merely use the dual
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2as the query code. This is simply due to the limitation imposed by quantum measurement, see the discussion
in Remark 2.
Further, we consider LRC coded storage, and adapt our QPIR scheme accordingly. The new scheme can
achieve a higher rate, which interestingly enough, does not depend on the length of the code (or number of
servers). As usual, this comes with a trade-off on collusion resistance.
In addition, we tested the QPIR scheme of Song et al. [11] for replicated storage on IBM’s quantum computers.
Numerical results of the best-performing quantum computer along with setup and discussion are presented in
Section VII.
II. BASICS ON PIR AND QUANTUM COMPUTATION
A. Notation
For any two vectors u = (u1, . . . , un), v = (v1, . . . , vn) of the same length n we denote their inner product
by 〈u|v〉 = u1v1 + · · · + unvn. We will denote by [n] the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, and by Fq the finite field of q
elements. In this paper, we only consider characteristic two, i.e., q = 2E for some positive integer E.
Let Γ = {γ1, ...., γE} be a basis of F2E over F2. For α ∈ Fq denote by ϕ the bijective, F2-linear map
ϕ : F2E → FE2
α =
E∑
i=1
αiγi 7→ (α1, . . . , αE) .
(1)
Note that this mapping preserves addition, i.e., ϕ(α+ α′) = ϕ(α) + ϕ(α′) ∀ α, α′ ∈ F2E .
B. Private Information Retrieval
Consider a storage system storing m files xi, i ∈ [m], where each server stores a share yi, i ∈ [m] of each
(encoded) file (for replication yK = xK). In a PIR protocol a user desiring the K-th file XK chooses a query
QK from a query space Q and transmits it to the servers. The servers’ response Ai is a function of the received
queries and the shares of the (encoded) files they store. By query and response here we mean the overall matrix
containing all the individual queries and responses. Below, QKT denotes the matrix of queries sent to a subset
T .
Definition 1 (Correctness). There exists a function D such that
D(AK , QK ,K) = xK , ∀ K ∈ [m] .
As usual, we assume honest-but-curious servers who follow the assigned protocol, but might try to determine
the index i of the file desired by the user.
Definition 2 (Privacy with t-Collusion). User privacy: Any set of at most t colluding nodes learns no information
about the index i of the desired file, i.e., the mutual information
I(i;QKT , A
K
T , yT ) = 0, ∀ T ⊂ [n], |T | ≤ t .
Server privacy: The user does not learn any information about the files other than the requested one, i.e.,
I(xj ;QK , AK ,K) = 0, ∀j 6= K .
A scheme with both user and server privacy is called symmetric.
As customary, we assume that the size of the query vectors is negligible compared to the size of the files.
Hence, we ignore the upload cost and define the PIR rate as follows:
Definition 3 (PIR Rate and Capacity). For a PIR scheme the rate is (non-rigorously) the number of information
bits of the requested file retrieved per downloaded bits, i.e.,
RPIR =
Number of bits in a file
Number of downloaded bits
.
The PIR capacity is the supremum of PIR rates of all possible PIR schemes, for a fixed parameter setting.
Remark 1. As the user and the servers do not share any entanglement in this model, the number of bits
obtained when receiving a qubit, i.e., the number of bits that can be communicated by transmitting a qubit
from a server to the user without privacy considerations, is the dimension of the qubit.
3C. Quantum Computation
In this section we introduce the notation to be used later on. For details we refer the reader to [16].
A qubit is a 2-dimensional Hilbert space H along with a computational basis, that is, a prespecified or-
thonormal basis B = {|0〉, |1〉}. One typically takes H = C2. A state of H is a unit vector |ψ〉 ∈ H, while
〈ψ| denotes the adjoint of |ψ〉, that is, 〈ψ| = |ψ〉†. Thus, 〈φ|ψ〉 and |φ〉〈ψ| define inner and outer products
respectively.
We will work with 2-qubit systems H = H1 ⊗H2. In this case the computational basis is B⊗2 = {|a〉 | a ∈
F22}, where |a〉 = |a1〉 ⊗ |a2〉. We will also use the maximally entangled state
|Φ〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) . (2)
We denote by |Φ〉ij the maximally entangled state defined on qubits Hi and Hj . For a, b ∈ F2, the Weyl
operator is defined as
W(a, b) = (−1)ab
1∑
i=0
(−1)ai|i+ b〉〈i|. (3)
We will writeWi(a, b) when the Weyl operator acts on the i-th qubit. With this notation, the following properties
of the Weyl operator are well-known and easy to verify:
W(a, b)T = (−1)abW(a, b), (4)
W(a1, b1)W(a2, b2) = (−1)a2b1W(a1 + a2, b1 + b2), (5)
W(a, b)TW(a, b) = W(a, b)W(a, b)T = I2, (6)
W2(a, b)|Φ〉 = (−1)abW1(a, b)|Φ〉. (7)
Lemma 1. The set
BF22 =
{
B(a,b) = W1(a, b)|Φ〉〈Φ|W1(a, b)T | a, b ∈ F2
}
is a projection-valued measure (PVM), that is, the matrix B(a,b) is a Hermitian projector for any (a, b) ∈ F22
and satisfies the completeness equation.
Proof. Straightforward.
Definition 4. The Bell measurement is the measurement defined by the PVM BF22 described in Lemma 1.
In the following we will require the two-sum transmission protocol [12].
Two-sum transmission protocol: This protocol allows to send the sum of two pairs of classical bits by
communicating two qubits. Suppose that Alice and Bob possess a qubit HA and HB , respectively, and share
the maximally entangled state |Φ〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HB . They would like to send the sum of Alice’s information
(a1, a2) ∈ F22 and Bob’s information (b1, b2) ∈ F22 to Carol through two quantum channels. The protocol is
given as follows:
(1) Alice and Bob apply the unitaries W(a1, a2) on HA and W(b1, b2) on HB , respectively;
(2) Alice and Bob send the qubits HA and HB , respectively, over noiseless quantum channels;
(3) Carol performs a Bell measurement on the system HA⊗HB and obtains (a1 + b1, a2 + b2) as the protocol
output.
III. [3,2]-CODED QPIR EXAMPLE WITH NO COLLUSION
Let us assume three servers which contain, respectively, the pieces xi1, x
i
2 and x
i
1 + x
i
2 for i ∈ [m]. For
simplicity, we suppose that xi1, x
i
2 ∈ F22 for each i ∈ [m], i.e., only one round is needed in order to retrieve
each piece xis from server s. The intuition coming from this simple scenario is the building block of the scheme
presented in Section IV.
Preparation Step. For each p ∈ [2] the servers prepare the following qubits and states. Server 2 possesses
4 qubits HL,(p)2 , HR,(p)2 , H(p)2 and HA,(p)2 , and the first and the last server possess qubits H(p)1 and H(p)3 ,
respectively. The maximally entangled state |Φ〉(p) is shared between the pairs
(
H(p)1 ,HL,(p)2
)
,
(
HR,(p)2 ,H(p)3
)
and
(
H(p)2 ,HA,(p)2
)
.
The protocol for querying the K-th file xK is depicted in Figure 1 and is described as follows:
1) Suppose we want to retrieve the piece xKp from server p ∈ [2]. The user generates a uniformly random
bit vector Q(p) :=
(
Q1,(p), . . . , Qm,(p)
)
. Let Q(p)p := Q(p) + emK and Q
(p)
s := Q(p) for any s ∈ [n] \ {p},
where Q(p) + emK means that we are flipping the K-th bit of the query Q
(p).
42) The user queries Q(p)s to server s for each s ∈ [3].
3) Server s ∈ [3] computes H(p)s := ∑mi=1Qi,(p)s xis ∈ F22. The first and the last server apply W(H(p)1 ) and
W
(
H
(p)
3
)
to the qubits H(p)1 and H(p)3 , respectively. Server 2 applies W
(
H
(p)
2
)
to the qubit HL,(p)2 and
performs a Bell measurement on HL,(p)2 ⊗HR,(p)2 whose outcome is denoted by G(p)2 ∈ F22. Then, server
2 applies W
(
G
(p)
2
)
to the qubit H(p)2 .
4) Each server sends its qubit H(p)s to the user. Server 2 sends also its additional qubit HA,(p)2 .
5) The user performs a Bell measurement to the pair H(p)2 ⊗HA,(p)2 to retrieve G(p)2 +(0, 0) via the two-sum
transmission protocol (cf. Sec. II-C). Then he applies W
(
G
(p)
2
)
to the qubit H(p)2 and performs a Bell
measurement on H(p)1 ⊗H(p)2 , whose outcome is xKp with probability 1.
6) Repeat all the previous steps for every piece p ∈ [2].
7) The user reconstructs the desired file xK =
(
xK1 , x
K
2
)
.
server1
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...
xm1
server2
x12
...
xm2
server3
x11 + x
1
2
...
xm1 + x
m
2
H(p)1 HL,(p)2 HR,(p)2
H(p)2 HA,(p)2
H(p)3
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Query index: K ∈ {1, . . . ,m} Outcome: xKp ∈ F22
|Φ〉(p) |Φ〉(p)
|Φ〉(p)
Q
(p)
1
Q
(p)
2
Q
(p)
3
H(p)1 H
(p)
2 ,
HA,(p)2
H(p)3
- Measurement on H(p)2 ⊗HA,(p)2
-W
(
G
(p)
2
)
to H(p)3
- Measurement on H(p)1 ⊗H(p)3
6
Figure 1. QPIR protocol with a [3,2]-parity-check code. Step 2 is depicted in blue, Step 4 in red and Step 5 in green.
The operations performed by the servers and the download step (Step 4) are visualized in Figure 2. After
Step 4, the user possesses the entangled pairs of qubits H(p)2 ⊗HA,(p)2 and H(p)1 ⊗H(p)3 for each p ∈ [2]. The
states of those two pairs are, respectively,
W2
(
G
(p)
2
)
|Φ〉2,2A ,
(−1)φ(p)3 W3
(∑
s=1
H(p)s +G
(p)
2
)
3
|Φ〉1,3 = (−1)φ
(p)
3 W3
(
xKp +G
(p)
2
)
|Φ〉1,3.
The last equality holds for every p ∈ [2]. In fact, assuming p = 1,
3∑
s=1
H(1)s =
m∑
i=1
(
Qi + δiK
)
xi1 +
m∑
i=1
Qixi2 +
m∑
i=1
Qi
(
xi1 + x
i
2
)
=
m∑
i=1
Qixi1 + x
K
1 +
m∑
i=1
Qixi2 +
m∑
i=1
Qi
(
xi1 + x
i
2
)
=
m∑
i=1
Qi
0︷ ︸︸ ︷(
xi1 + x
i
2 + x
i
1 + x
i
2
)
+xK1 = x
K
1 .
5H1
W(H1)
server1
HL2
W(H2)
server2
HR2 H3
server3
H1 H3
W(H3)
Operation from
server3
server1 server3
W(G2)
H2 HA2
server2
Operation from
server2
user
|Φ〉 |Φ〉
|Φ〉
(−1)φ3W
(∑3
s=1Hs +G2
)
3 |Φ〉1,3
Bell measurement
with outcome G2
Operation from
server3
7
Figure 2. Operations on servers visualized. The download step is depicted in green. These operations are performed for every p ∈ [2].
The proof for p = 2 is the same. Performing a Bell measurement on the first pair, the user retrieves G(p)2 and
then applies W
(
G
(p)
2
)
to the qubit H(p)3 . Doing so, the state of the second pair becomes
(−1)φ(p)3 W
(
G
(p)
2
)
3
W
(
xKp +G
(p)
2
)
3
|Φ〉1,3
(5)︷︸︸︷
=(−1)φ(p)u W3
(
xKp +
0︷ ︸︸ ︷
G
(p)
2 +G
(p)
2
)
|Φ〉1,3
= (−1)φ(p)u W3
(
xKp
) |Φ〉1,3.
Performing now the Bell measurement on the second pair, the user retrieves xKp with probability 1.
User secrecy is achieved for any p because the query Q(p) is independent of the index K. Server secrecy is
achieved for any p because the received state of the user is independent of the fragments xip with i 6= K and
the measurement outcome G(p)2 is independent of any file. The rate is R =
2·2
2·4 =
1
2 , since we recovered four
bits and downloaded eight qubits carrying one bit over two rounds.
IV. [n, k]-MDS CODED QPIR WITH t-COLLUSION
Let n be the number of servers, L = min
{
l ∈ N : 4l ≥ n} and F4L be the finite field with 4L elements. We
present a protocol with user and server secrecy, in which the user retrieves a file xK from a DSS of n servers
coded with an [n, k]-MDS storage code C. We denote the k × n generator matrix of the code by GC . In this
setting, we can protect against (n− k)-collusion. Each file xi is split into k pieces and then divided into β
stripes xib =
(
xib,1, . . . , x
i
b,k
)
, i.e., the set of files is given by X =
{
xib ∈ (F4L)k : i ∈ [m] , b ∈ [β]
}
with file
size F = kβ log2
(
4L
)
= 2kLβ. Server s ∈ [n] stores the symbol yis =
(
yi1,s, . . . , y
i
β,s
)
, where yib,s is the s-th
column of xibGC .
Since the storage code is MDS, we need any k symbols of the codeword in order to retrieve the file [17].
Without loss of generality, we will retrieve the symbols stored in the first k servers, i.e., we will assume to
retrieve the symbol yKs from server s ∈ [k] after β rounds.
A. A coded QPIR scheme
Preparation Step. For each p ∈ [k] the servers prepare the following qubits and states. Server s ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}
possesses 3Lβ qubits HL,(l,b,p)s , HR,(l,b,p)s and H(l,b,p)s , where l ∈ [L], b ∈ [β]. The first and the last server
possess Lβ qubits H(l,b,p)1 = HR,(l,b,p)1 and H(l,b,p)n = HL,(l,b,p)n , respectively. If n is odd, server n − 1
possesses Lβ additional qubits HA,(l,b,p)n−1 . The maximally entangled state |Φ〉(l,b,p) is shared between each pair
6(
HR,(l,b,p)s ,HL,(l,b,p)s+1
)
for any s ∈ [n− 1] and
(
H(l,b,p)2c ,H(l,b,p)2c+1
)
for any c ∈ [⌊n2 ⌋− 1]. If n is odd, then an
additional |Φ〉(l,b,p) is shared between H(l,b,p)n−1 and HA,(l,b,p)n−1 .
The protocol for querying the K-th file xK is depicted in Figure 3 and is described as follows:
(1) Suppose the user wants to retrieve the symbol yKp stored in server p ∈ [k]. Then, he generates n − k
independent and uniformly random vectors Z(p)1 , . . . , Z
(p)
n−k ∈ (F4L)m, and encodes them as codewords
of the dual code of C. In other words, the user builds the queries Q(p)1 , . . . , Q(p)n multiplying the random
vectors by the generator matrix GC⊥ of the dual code C⊥, i.e.,[
Q
(p)
1 · · · Q(p)n
]
=
[
Z
(p)
1 · · · Z(p)n−k
]
GC⊥+ξK,p,
where ξK,p is the null matrix with a 1 in position (K, p).
(2) The user send query Q(p)s to each server s ∈ [n].
(3) In round b, server s ∈ [n] computes H(b,p)s = 〈Q(p)s |yb,s〉 ∈ F4L and divides it into L elements H(1,b,p)s , . . . ,H(L,b,p)s
of F22 by the bijection ϕ defined in (1). For each l ∈ [L], the servers perform these steps:
(a) server 1 and server n apply W
(
H
(l,b,p)
1
)
and W
(
H
(l,b,p)
n
)
to the qubits H(l,b,p)1 and H(l,b,p)n , respec-
tively;
(b) server s ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1} appliesW
(
H
(l,b,p)
s
)
to the qubitHL,(l,b,p)s and performs a Bell measurement
on HL,(l,b,p)s ⊗ HR,(l,b,p)s the outcome of which is denoted by G(l,b,p)s ∈ F22. Then, server s applies
W
(
G
(l,b,p)
s
)
to the qubit H(l,b,p)s .
(4) Each server sends its L qubits H(l,b,p)s to the user. If n is odd, server n− 1 sends its additional L qubits
HA,(l,b,p)n−1 .
(5) For each l ∈ [L], the user performs the following steps:
(a) If n is even, he performs a Bell measurement on each pair H(l,b,p)2c ⊗ H(l,b,p)2c+1 to retrieve G(l,b,p)2c +
G
(l,b,p)
2c+1 via the two-sum transmission protocol (cf. Sec. II-C) for every c ∈
[
n
2 − 1
]
, and computes
G(l,b,p) =
∑n
2−1
c=1
(
G
(l,b,p)
2c +G
(l,b,p)
2c+1
)
. If n is odd, he also performs a Bell measurement on the pair
H(l,b,p)n−1 ⊗HA,(b,p)n−1 to retrieve G(l,b,p)n−1 and computes G(l,b,p) =
∑bn2 c−1
c=1
(
G
(l,b,p)
2c +G
(l,b,p)
2c+1
)
+G
(l,b,p)
n−1 .
(b) He applies W
(
G(l,b,p)
)
to the qubit H(l,b,p)n and performs a Bell measurement on H(l,b,p)1 ⊗H(l,b,p)n ,
whose outcome is yK,(l)b,p with probability 1.
Finally, he reconstructs yKb,p from the L outcomes through the bijection (1).
(6) Repeat Steps 3, 4 and 5 for every round b ∈ [β].
(7) Repeat all the previous steps for every piece p ∈ [k].
(8) Now the user possesses
{
yKb,p : b ∈ [β] , p ∈ [k]
}
. First, he reconstructs yKp from the β elements of F4L for
each p ∈ [k] and builds yK = (yK1 , . . . , yKk ). Then, he computes the desired file xK from the equation
yK = xKG′C , where G
′
C is the k × k submatrix of GC constructed with its first k columns.
B. Properties of the coded QPIR scheme
Lemma 2. The scheme of Section IV-A is correct, i.e., fulfills Definition 1.
Proof. The final state before the measurement performed by the user is reached in the same way as the one of
the QPIR protocol in [12] for each p ∈ [k]. Thus, during round b ∈ [β] and for packet l ∈ [L], that final state is
(−1)φ˜nWn
(
n∑
s=1
Hs
)
|Φ〉, (8)
where φ˜n ∈ F2 is determined upon H1, . . . ,Hn, G1, . . . , Gn−1 and G.
We need to prove that the outcome of the measurement performed on the system H(l,b,p)1 ⊗H(l,b,p)n is yK,(l)b,p
for every b ∈ [β], p ∈ [k] and l ∈ [L]. Suppose L = 1 and fixed b, p. We have H(b,p)s = 〈Q(p)s |yb,s〉. Denoting
7server1
y11
...
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· · ·
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y1n−1
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ymn−1
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...
ymn
user
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H(l,b,p)2
server2
· · ·
· · ·
HR,(l,b,p)n−2
H(l,b,p)n−2
servern−2
HL,(l,b,p)n−1
H(l,b,p)n−1
HR,(l,b,p)n−1
HA,(l,b,p)n−1
if n
is odd
H(l,b,p)n
Query index: K ∈ {1, . . . ,m} Outcome:yK,(l)p,b ∈ F22
|Φ〉 |Φ〉
|Φ〉
if n
is even
|Φ〉
|Φ〉
Q
(p)
1 Q
(p)
n−1
Q
(p)
n
H(l,b,p)1 H(l,b,p)n−1 H
(l,b,p)
n
Apply W
(
G(l,b,p)
)
on H(l,b,p)n and
measure
H(l,b,p)1 ⊗H(l,b,p)n
11
Figure 3. QPIR protocol with an [n, k]-MDS code. Step 2 is depicted in blue, Step 4 in red and Step 5 in green. Steps 4 and 5 are repeated Lβ times per
piece. The maximally entangled state |Φ〉 in the figure denotes |Φ〉(l,b,p).
enp the zero vector with length n and a 1 in position p, δi,Ke
n
p is the i-th row of ξK,p. Therefore,
n∑
s=1
H(b,p)s =
n∑
s=1
〈Q(p)s |yb,s〉 =
n∑
s=1
m∑
i=1
Qi,(p)s y
i
b,s =
m∑
i=1
n∑
s=1
Qi,(p)s y
i
b,s
=
m∑
i=1
〈Qi,(p)|
yib︷ ︸︸ ︷(
yib,1, . . . , y
i
b,n
)〉 = m∑
i=1
yib
(
Qi,(p)
)
T
=
m∑
i=1
(
xibGC
) (
Zi,(p)GC⊥ + δiKe
n
p
)
T
=
m∑
i=1
xib
0︷ ︸︸ ︷
GC (GC⊥)T
(
Zi,(p)
)
T + xKb GC
(
enp
)
T (a)= yKb
(
enp
)
T = yKb,p,
where (a) holds because the dual of a code is its nullspace.
If L > 1, we have that H(l,b,p)s is the l-th entry of 〈Q(p)s |yb,s〉 written as vector of
(
F22
)L
. Then, by the same
arguments as above, we get
∑n
s=1H
(l,b,p)
s = y
K,(l)
b,p . As the bijection of (1) between F4L and
(
F22
)L
preserves
addition, we have that
n∑
s=1
H(b,p)s =
n∑
s=1
(
H(1,b,p)s , . . . ,H
(L,b,p)
s
)
(1)
=
(
n∑
s=1
H(1,b,p)s , . . . ,
n∑
s=1
H(L,b,p)s
)
=
(
y
K,(1)
b,p , . . . , y
K,(L)
b,p
)
= yKb,p.
The same argument applies to the packetization of the element G(b,p) =
(
G(1,b,p), . . . , G(L,b,p)
)
. Thus, the
correctness of the protocol is proved for every n ∈ N.
Remark 2. The presented scheme can be viewed as the “quantum version” of the scheme in [15]. In that
scheme a vector holding the n replies of the servers (denoted Hs in our work) can be viewed as a random
codeword of a single parity check (SPC) code plus one symbol of the desired file added in one (known) position.
As is the definition of SPCs, summing over all components of this received vector leaves only the symbol of
the desired file. This sum is exactly the sum in (8). In [7] the scheme of [15] was generalized to any t, k with
8t+ k ≤ n, which allowed for recovering up to n− (k + t− 1) symbols in each round. Similarly, the received
vector is a random codeword, but symbols of the desired file are added in multiple positions. To recover each
of the desired symbols, the user performs multiple, distinct linear combinations of the remaining positions.
The property that allows our quantum PIR protocol, as well as the protocols in [11], [12], to increase the
rate compared to the classic setting is the fact that the user already receives a linear combination of these
elements as an outcome of the quantum measurement, and therefore does not have to download all the symbols
Hs separately. However, this quantum measurement entails that only one single linear combination can be
performed, and thereby only one symbol retrieved per round. This leads to the condition n− (k + t− 1) = 1
or equivalently n = k + t. Note that since the restriction of an MDS code to a subset of positions is again an
MDS code, we can always apply the protocol to a subset of k + t servers if the actual number of servers in a
storage system is n > k + t.
Lemma 3. The scheme of Section IV-A is symmetric and protects against t-collusion in the sense of Definition 2.
Proof. For any p the queries Q(p)1 , . . . , Q
(p)
n are independent of the index K and generated by encoding random
vectors by the dual code C⊥. Since the dual code is MDS1, every set of n − k positions in these codewords
is independent and hence at least n− k + 1 servers are needed in order to determine the file requested. Thus,
user privacy is achieved. For each l ∈ [L], server secrecy is achieved because in every round b the received
state of the user is independent of the fragments yi,(l)b,p with i 6= K and the measurement outcomes G(l,b,p)s are
mutually independent and independent of any file for all s ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
Theorem 1. The PIR rate of the scheme in Section IV-A is
RPIR =
{
2
n , if n is even,
2
n+1 , if n is odd,
where n = k + t.
Proof. The upload cost is UPIR = kn |Q| = kmn and limF→∞ UPIRF = limβ→∞ kmn2kLβ = 0. Hence, we consider
the upload cost to be negligible compared to the download cost for a large file size F . As discussed in Remark 1,
every qubit carries 1 bit of information. The download cost is Ln or L(n+ 1) qubits per round and piece, i.e.,
DPIR = kLnβ or DPIR = kL(n + 1)β bits, if n is even or odd, respectively. The information retrieved is a
symbol of F4L per round and piece, i.e., IPIR = kβ log2(4L) = 2kLβ bits. Thus, the rate is RPIR =
2kLβ
kLnβ =
2
n
if n is even and RPIR = 2kLβkL(n+1)β =
2
n+1 if n is odd.
V. [4,2]-CODED QPIR EXAMPLE
Let us consider n = 4 servers. Then L = 1, and the base field is F4 =
{
0, 1, α, α2
}
where α is a primitive
element that satisfies
α2 + α+ 1 = 0. (9)
Suppose also β = 1, hence the set of files xi =
(
xi1, x
i
2
)
is given by X = {xi ∈ (F4)2 : i ∈ [m]}. The files
are encoded with a [4, 2]-Reed–Solomon storage code with generator matrix
GC =
[
1 0 α2 α
0 1 α α2
]
.
Hence, the codewords are
yi = xiGC =
[
xi1 x
i
2 α
2xi1 + αx
i
2 αx
i
1 + α
2xi2
]
.
Server s ∈ [4] stores the s-th column of yi, namely yis.
Preparation Step. For each p ∈ [2] the servers prepare the following qubits and states. Server s ∈ {2, 3}
possesses 3 qubits HL,(p)s , HR,(p)s and H(p)s . The first and the last server possess qubits H(p)1 and H(p)3 , respec-
tively. The maximally entangled state |Φ〉(p) is shared between the pairs
(
H(p)1 ,HL,(p)2
)
,
(
HR,(p)2 ,HL,(p)3
)
,(
HR,(p)3 ,H(p)4
)
and
(
H(p)2 ,H(p)3
)
.
The protocol for querying the K-th file xK is depicted in Figure 4 and is described as follows:
(1) The user wants to retrieve the symbol yKp stored in server p ∈ [2]. He generates two independent and
uniformly random vectors Z(p)1 , Z
(p)
2 ∈ (F4)m, and encodes them as codewords of the dual code of C. In
1It is well-known that the dual of an MDS code is also an MDS code.
9other words, the user builds the queries Q(p)1 , . . . , Q
(p)
4 multiplying the random vectors by the generator
matrix2 GC⊥ = GC , i.e., during round p the queries are[
Q1 · · · Q4
]
=
[
Z1 Z2
]
GC⊥ + ξK,p
=
[
Z1 Z2 α
2Z1 + αZ2 αZ1 + α
2Z2
]
+ ξK,p,
where ξK,p is the null matrix with a 1 in position (K, p).
(2) The user sends query Q(p)s to each server s ∈ [4].
(3) Server s ∈ [4] computes H(p)s = 〈Q(p)s |ys〉 ∈ F4. For bijection (1) each H(p)s can be written as an element
of F22. Then, the first and the last server apply W
(
H
(p)
1
)
and W
(
H
(p)
4
)
to the qubits H(p)1 and H(p)4 ,
respectively. Server s ∈ {2, 3} applies W
(
H
(p)
s
)
to the qubit HL,(p)s and performs a Bell measurement on
HL,(p)s ⊗HR,(p)s whose outcome is denoted by G(p)s ∈ F22. Finally, server s applies W
(
G
(p)
s
)
to the qubit
H(p)s .
(4) Each server sends its qubit H(p)s to the user.
(5) The user performs a Bell measurement to the pair H(p)2 ⊗ H(p)3 to retrieve G(p) = G(p)2 + G(p)3 via the
two-sum transmission protocol (cf. Sec. II-C). He applies W
(
G(p)
)
to the qubit H(p)4 and performs a Bell
measurement on H(p)1 ⊗H(p)4 , whose outcome is yKp with probability 1.
(6) Repeat all the previous steps for every piece p ∈ [2].
(7) Since servers 1 and 2 contain the symbols xi1 and x
i
2 respectively, the user can directly build the file
xK =
(
xK1 , x
K
2
)
.
server1
x11
...
xm1
server2
x12
...
xm2
server3
α2x11 + αx
1
2
...
α2xm1 + αx
m
2
server4
αx11 + α
2x12
...
αxm1 + α
2xm2
user
H(p)1 HL,(p)2
H(p)2
HR,(p)2 HL,(p)n
H(p)n
HR,(p)n H(p)n+1
Query index: K ∈ {1, . . . ,m} Outcome:xKp ∈ F22
|Φ〉(p) |Φ〉(p)
|Φ〉(p)
|Φ〉(p)
Q
(p)
1 Q
(p)
2 Q
(p)
3
Q
(p)
4H(p)1
H(p)2 H(p)3 H(p)4
- Measurement on H(p)2 ⊗H(p)3
-W
(
G(p)
)
to H(p)4
- Measurement on H(p)1 ⊗H(p)4
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Figure 4. QPIR protocol with an [4, 2]-RS code. Step 2 is depicted in blue, Step 4 in red and Step 5 in green.
The operations performed by the servers and the download step (Step 4) are visualized in Figure 5. After
these steps, the user possesses the entangled pairs of qubits H(p)2 ⊗H(p)3 and H(p)1 ⊗H(p)4 for each p ∈ [2]. The
states of those two pairs are, respectively,
W2
(
G
(p)
2
)
W3
(
G
(p)
3
)
|Φ〉
(7), (5)︷︸︸︷
=W3
(
G(p)
)
|Φ〉,
(−1)φ(p)4 W4
(
4∑
s=1
H(p)s +G
(p)
)
|Φ〉,
2The code chosen in this example is self-dual.
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H1
W(H1)
server1
HL2
W(H2)
server2
HR2 HL3
W(H3)
server3
HR3 H4
server4
W(H4)
H1 H4
server1 server4
W(G2) W(G3)
H2 H3
server2 server3
user
|Φ〉 |Φ〉 |Φ〉
|Φ〉
(−1)φ4W4
(∑4
s=1Hs +G
)
|Φ〉
Bell measurement
with outcome G2
Bell measurement
with outcome G3
Operation on
server4
13
Figure 5. Servers’ operations and download step (depicted in green) for the QPIR protocol with a [4, 2]-RS code. These operations are performed for every
p ∈ [2].
where
∑4
s=1H
(p)
s = xKp . In fact, assuming p = 1,
4∑
s=1
H(1)s =
m∑
i=1
(
Qi1 + δiK
)
yi1 +
m∑
i=1
Qi2y
i
2 +
m∑
i=1
Qi3y
i
3 +
m∑
i=1
Qi4y
i
4 =
m∑
i=1
Zi1x
i
1 + x
K
1
+
m∑
i=1
Zi2x
i
2 +
m∑
i=1
(
α2Zi1 + αZ
i
2
) (
α2xi1 + αx
i
2
)
+
m∑
i=1
(
αZi1 + α
2Zi2
) (
αxi1 + α
2xi2
)
(9)︷︸︸︷
= xK1 +
m∑
i=1
Zi1x
i
1 +
m∑
i=1
Zi2x
i
2 +
m∑
i=1
αZi1x
i
1 +
m∑
i=1
Zi1x
i
2 +
m∑
i=1
Zi2x
i
1 +
m∑
i=1
α2Zi2x
i
2
+
m∑
i=1
α2Zi1x
i
1 +
m∑
i=1
Zi1x
i
2 +
m∑
i=1
Zi2x
i
1 +
m∑
i=1
αZi2x
i
2
(9)︷︸︸︷
= xK1 .
The proof for p = 2 is the same. Performing a Bell measurement on the first pair, the user retrieves G(p) and
then applies W
(
G(p)
)
to the qubit H(p)4 . Doing so, the state of the second pair becomes
(−1)φ(p)4 W4
(
G(p)
)
W4
(
xKp +G
(p)
)
|Φ〉 (5)= (−1)φ(p)u W4
(
xKp
) |Φ〉.
Performing now the Bell measurement on the second pair, the user retrieves xKp with probability 1. After
retrieving xK1 and x
K
2 , the user depacketizes the requested file x
K .
User and server secrecy are achieved for Lemma 3. The rate is RPIR = 2·22·4 =
1
2 , since we recovered four
bits and downloaded eight qubits each carrying one bit over two rounds.
VI. IMPROVING THE RETRIEVAL RATES BY LOCALLY REPAIRABLE CODES
The restriction of the rate for the scheme presented in Section IV-A arises from only being able to download
a single symbol of the codeword corresponding to the desired file in each round (cf. Rem. 2). Interestingly, for a
scheme with this restriction, regardless of whether it is a quantum or a classical system, it can be advantageous
in terms of the retrieval rate to operate on a storage system that is encoded with a locally repairable code (LRC)
[18], [19]. Without such a restriction on the number of downloaded symbols, LRCs are not known to be able
to improve the retrieval rates. For a set of integers A ⊂ [n] denote the restriction of the [n, k] code C to the
coordinates indexed by A by C|A.
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Definition 5. An [n, k] code C is said to have (r, ρ)-locality if there exists a partition P = {A1, ...,Aµ} of [n]
into sets Al with Al ≤ r + ρ − 1, ∀l ∈ [µ] such that for the distance of the code restricted to the positions
indexed by Al it holds that d(CAl) ≥ ρ, ∀ l ∈ [µ].
The sets A1, ...,Aµ are referred to as the repair sets of the code and the restriction C|Al of the code C to the
positions of Al as the l-th local code. We say a locally repairable code is optimal if it fulfills the Singleton-like
bound [18], [19]
d ≤ n− k + 1−
(⌈
k
r
⌉
− 1
)
(ρ− 1)
with equality. For simplicity, here we only consider LRCs with disjoint repair sets and assume that r|k, so we
can omit the ceiling operation. It is well known that for an optimal LRC the local codes are [r+ρ−1, r]-MDS
codes and that picking from kr local codes arbitrary r positions each results in an information set. The latter
can readily be seen by puncturing the LRC such that only kr repair sets remain. Then the distance is
d ≥ n− k + 1−
(
k
r
− 1
)
(ρ− 1)−
(
n
r + ρ− 1 −
k
r
)
(r + ρ− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
maximal decrease in distance due to puncturing
= ρ
and since each of the remaining repair sets is an [r+ρ−1, r] MDS code, it holds that d = ρ. Clearly, puncturing
each of these local codes in any ρ− 1 positions does not decrease the rank (dimension) within the local code,
and thereby also not the overall rank (dimension). It follows that the remaining k positions form an information
set of the LRC.
Assume we are given a PIR scheme PIR(n, k, t, i, j), where n = k + t, of rate RPIR = 2k+t that retrieves 1
symbol j of the i-the file per round from an [n, k] MDS coded storage system. Let the storage code C be an
optimal [n, k, r, ρ] LRC as above. Let I ⊂ ⋃k/rl=1Al such that |I ∩ Al| = r, ∀l ∈ [kr ] (we choose the first kr
repair sets A1, ...,A k
r
w.l.o.g.). As shown above, performing the PIR scheme PIR(r+ ρ− 1, r, t, i, j), ∀j ∈ I
on the MDS code CAl given by the repair set with j ∈ Al, results in an information set of the LRC and
therefore allows for the i-th file to be recovered.
Corollary 1. The retrieval rate of the above LRC-based QPIR scheme is
RQPIR =
{ 2
r+t , if r + t is even,
2
r+t+1 , if r + t is odd,
.
Proof. By Theorem 1 the rate for the retrieval of each symbol of I is given by
RlocalQPIR =
{ 2
r+t , if r + t is even,
2
r+t+1 , if r + t is odd,
where t = ρ− 1. As the scheme is applied to the local repair sets a total of k times to obtain k symbols of the
desired file, the overall rate is given by the local rate RlocalQPIR.
Note that for LRC coded storage the QPIR rate does no longer directly depend on the length n of the code.
Since the locality parameter r is usually considerably smaller than the code dimension k, this results in an
increase in the retrieval rate compared to the rate for MDS coded storage of Theorem 1. On the other hand, as
ρ is typically small, this comes at the cost of a lowered resistance against collusion and total number of server
failures that can be tolerated. However, the scheme is still able to resist more than t = ρ− 1 colluding nodes,
provided that no more than t nodes collude per local group. Explicitly, for such collusion patterns, the scheme
can resist collusion of up to tµ = (ρ− 1)µ servers.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We implemented and tested the QPIR protocol with no collusion described by Song et al. [11] using
the programming language Python. We chose this language because it provides the library qiskit, which
allows for writing high-level code for simple implementations on IBM quantum computers [20]. Note that the
implementation is not a perfect correspondence to our model, as a quantum channel was not at our disposal.
The source code of the implementation is available on Github [21].
A. Assumptions
The goal of testing the protocol on a real quantum computer was to determine how consistently the quantum
measurement results in the requested file. Thus, we made the following assumptions.
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• Perfect qubit transmission. There is no error in the distribution of the entangled states to the servers and
in the transmission of the qubits from the servers to the user. This is achieved by making the operations
of the server and the user on the same quantum computer. We made this assumption for two reasons:
(1) we are interested in the measurement of the pair of qubits for privately retrieving the requested file;
(2) qiskit does not provide a way to simulate the transmission of a qubit between two IBM quantum
computers.
• File requested. The file requested is always either the bit string 0000 or the bit string 1111. This
assumption was made after observing that the probability of a 0 to be measured as 1 is different from the
probability of a 1 to be measured as a 0, which makes the measurement non-symmetric – in contrast to
assumptions on the channel generally made in the classical setting. We give a hypothesis on the reason
for this behaviour in Section VII-C.
• Storage. The number of files is m = 4096:
(1) the index of the requested file is K = 1, i.e., we request the first file;
(2) the other m− 1 uniformly distributed and generated randomly at every trial.
The first assumption is made because the index K of the file requested is independent of the measurement
of the qubits. The second assumption was made to guarantee some randomization in the operations executed
by the servers.
• File size. Each file consists of 4 bits. This assumption was made because the number of qubits of the
most stable IBM quantum computer available at the time of testing (backend name ibmqx2) is 5 qubits.
Note that any length of 2R, R ∈ N, would be possible, but this would have implied dR2 e requests to the
ibmqx2 computer, which is not useful for our scope. This implies that in our tests we split each file in
the database in R = 2 pieces of two bits.
• Trials. We ran the test for over 100 trials, i.e., we generated 100 databases of m files each and made 100
measurements. We input 8192 shots to each measurement to obtain a more precise result. This enabled us
to compute the average accuracy over a total of 819200 shots.
B. Majority decisions
First, let us describe how a measurement is performed on an IBM quantum computer. We need to repeat the
same circuit that generates the state and several measurements for sampling. Since every operation performed
on a quantum computer has a certain probability of error, a single measurement consists of a number of shots,
i.e., repetitions of the same quantum circuit, which is 1024 by default and can be set up to 8192. The result of
a measurement is a dictionary containing the following:
• the keys are the strings of bits that received at least 1 shot;
• the values are the number of shots associated to each bit string.
We recall that the probability of measuring the file requested in the last step of the protocol is 1. Thus, the
number of shots given to the bit string associated to the file requested in the dictionary should be maximal
in each measurement (i.e., 8192), but this does not happen because the quantum computers are not perfectly
stable. Hence, some other bit strings can appear in the dictionary produced from the measurement. In order to
retrieve the file requested from the dictionary, we decided to implement the following majority decisions over
groups of g bits:
(1) for g = 1, perform a majority decision for each bit of the file independently;
(2) for g = 2kLβ = 4, perform a joint majority decision for all bits of the file.
Which of these majority decisions performs favorably depends on the nature of the error events. If the errors
of different bit levels are independent, an independent decision on each bit level is optimal. However, if the
error probabilities of the different bit levels are correlated such that an error in the measurement of one bit
increases the probability of error on the other bit levels, a majority decision on the entire file can yield better
results. For both decision rules we give the average accuracy per shot and the variance.
C. Testing on ibmqx2
In Table I we compare the average accuracies and variances per shot for the different realizations of the
requested file and majority decision strategies. Note that on the ibmqx2 computer every majority decision
applied to the received dictionary resulted in the correct file requested during a given trial. So, despite the fact
that the error probability for each shot was around 4–20%, the majority vote resulted in the correct reconstruction
of the requested file.
First, we see that the average time for computing every single shot is 5.5 milliseconds. Hence, if quantum
computation was perfect, we could use single-shot trials and avoid implementing the majority decisions.
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File 0000 File 1111
g = 1
0.9600 ± 0.9679 ± 0.9677 ± 0.9738 ± 0.9365 ± 0.9389 ± 0.9519 ± 0.9476 ±
3.50e-03 1.59e-03 1.86e-03 2.19e-03 4.34e-03 2.17e-03 2.38e-03 2.80e-03
g = 4 0.9065 ± 0.0116 0.8159 ± 0.0130
Time 5.56e-03 s 5.58e-03 s
(per shot)
Table I. Average accuracies and variances with m = 4096 on ibmqx2.
Hence, error free quantum computation would imply a huge speed-up in computation. In real systems the
error probability could be improved with methods such as quantum error correction.
We observe that, in general, as g is increasing, the average accuracies decrease, while the variances remain
around the same order. This implies that the different bit levels are indeed independent.
Interestingly, the accuracies change significantly when requesting the file 0000 compared to requesting the
file 1111. In particular, requesting 1111 appears to be much less accurate. This may happen because a qubit,
when initialized, is in the state |0〉. In order to put it in the state |1〉, we have to apply an X gate, which evidently
increases the error probability and can result in an error in the quantum computation. Thus, we suppose that
requesting the file 0000 is the best case scenario, while requesting 1111 is the worst case scenario. This is
the main reason why we only provide measurement outputs for these realizations of the file.
Remark 3. The numerical results presented above correspond to tests on ibmqx2. We performed similar tests
on different quantum computers provided by IBM, and we point out here, that as expected, the performance
deteriorates with higher number of qubits.
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